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Abstract—The upcoming WebRTC-based browser-to-browser
communication services present new challenges for user discovery
in peer-to-peer mode. Even more so, if we wish to enable different
web communication services to interact. This paper presents
Identity Mapping and Discovery Service (IMaDS), a global,
scalable, service independent discovery service that enables users
of web-based peer-to-peer applications to discover other users
whom to communicate with. It also provides reachability and
presence information. For that, user identities need to be mapped
to any compatible service identity as well as to a globally
unique, service-independent identity. This mapping and discovery
process is suitable for multiple identifier formats and personal
identifying properties, but it supports user-determined privacy
options. IMaDS operates across different service domains dy-
namically, using context information. Users and devices have
profiles containing context and other specific information that
can be discovered by a search engine. The search results reveal
the user’s allocated globally unique identifier (GUID), which is
then resolved to a list of the user’s service domains identities,
using a DHT-based directory service. Service-specific directories
allow tracking of active endpoints, where users are currently
logged on and can be contacted.
Keywords—discovery, identity mapping, communication end-
points, GUID, WebRTC, DHT, registry
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of WebRTC [1] is poised to change the
landscape of web calling, moving from specialized Internet
VoIP (Voice over IP) services to generic browser-based call-
ing from any visited website. While currently VoIP service
providers do not interwork, often by choice (to encourage
viral growth), browser-based web calling would seek cross-
browser interactions, to enhance website businesses who regard
communications as a means to an end. Such web calling ’tools’
must overcome issues not faced by current communication
services. WebRTC has simplified peer media exchange over
the Internet, but there are still major inhibitors for inter-service
VoIP compatibility. The work described in this paper addresses
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three of these: common identity formats or authentication,
discovery of identity partners, and discovery of availability
status.
There are no developed standards to enable web services
to interpret generic user identifier formats, such as the in-
ternational telephone numbering scheme. Where necessary,
these traditional numbers are the only globally recognizable
format. Additionally, unlike mobile networks, web calling
services need to be aware of the presence status of users,
including information about the used service provider and
support means of alerting them to incoming communication.
Since web services can be accessed from different devices,
there is another problem of finding users, since the procedure
is anchored at a particular endpoint.
The reTHINK project1 developed an Identity Mapping
and Discovery Service (IMaDS) in order to find contactable
and active endpoints (software that handles interactions within
terminals/devices). This service has been developed for We-
bRTC peer-to-peer (P2P) calling, using specially designed
reTHINK endpoint clients, but IMaDS scope may be applied
to other services, regardless of the protocol or the type of
user. The mapping and availability discovery mechanisms
can apply to context-aware applications that require dynamic
intervention and timely reactions. The IMaDS approach is
pluralistic and open. It is designed to encourage interworking
between service providers who offer a variety of communi-
cation services between users, where users may be humans
or machines. IMaDS protects the privacy of its users and
provides a fine grained access configuration. It can be used
across domains and different identifier formats. It enables
searching for endpoints within a specific context, which is
useful in Smart City and Internet of Things domains, and many
more. While traditional VoIP servers can provide ’presence’
information for contactable destination parties within a single
service, connecting peering users on different services presents
a far more difficult task. Establishing users’ ability to receive
communication is critical, where there is no central server to
1reTHINK project website: http://rethink-project.eu
log the attempt. Not only the user identifier needs to be dis-
covered, but also which device and which service are currently
used. A browser-based communication client at the caller’s
device needs to know the dynamically changing address of the
communication client at the called endpoint in order to connect
the media (messages or voice/video) between the browsers
(using the browser’s WebRTC APIs), device to device. Users
may be logged in to different service domains and service
providers, and may use dynamic environments where clients
are ’on’ or ’off’ frequently. Unlike calling via a network
server, P2P interactions require both parties to be ’on’, or
the communication attempt would fail unconditionally, with no
trace of the attempt. The reTHINK project has developed P2P
communication endpoints named hyperties (hyper-entities) [2].
They are micro-services that are downloaded onto the device
runtime environment. There are different hyperties for different
services, e.g., communication for classic voice, video, and chat
services, or inter-object interactions for Internet of Things
devices. A hyperty is typically implemented as a piece of
JavaScript code from a library on a service provider’s website,
which is downloaded to the user’s browser. The hyperty utilizes
the browser’s built-in WebRTC APIs, without the need for
plugins. Session setup is also simplified and all that is required
is the URL of the communication partner. IMaDS is able
to retrieve this URL and ascertain the user availability on a
particular device and its current IP address.
The rest of the paper includes the state-of-the-art in Section
II, the IMaDS approach and methods in Section III, the usage
scenarios in Section IV, and conclusions in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The WebRTC standard draft [1] discusses identities and
authentication, but does not specify how to find communication
endpoints. Currently, WebRTC session setup is not defined in
standards. The IETF draft in [3] lists requirements for identity
discovery considering different privacy levels. The standard
directory service is provided by Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) [4], which allows organizing information in
’Directory Information Trees’. However, this is too restrictive
for an open system where there is no one size fits all schema,
no single identifier format, and variable context information.
Discovery methods fall into two approaches: distributed peer-
to-peer (P2P) discovery mechanisms and central directory
systems. In P2P discovery, peers are assumed to know only
their neighbors, but every discovery query is routed to other
peers. The Gnutella protocol [5] is a classic example of this,
where queries are flooded. Peer discovery is fault-tolerant and
works even when some peers are offline, but it produces high
network loading and does not scale. BitTorrent uses a central
directory, the tracker, to enable peers to find other peers [6].
Clients register when they log in, and their status is changed
when they sign off. The tracker records the service, device, and
IP address, so that clients are contactable and discoverable. The
central directory approach has a single point of failure, but the
network traffic is minimal and easily manageable. A central
directory is also used in communication services like Google
Hangout2 and Skype3. However, this approach allows only a
single service to discover its own users, and there is no possible
2Google Hangouts: https://hangouts.google.com
3Skype: https://skype.com
discovery of endpoints that are registered with another service.
What is required is a collaborative ecosystem of such central
directories that allow searching across participating services.
The Domain Name Service (DNS) [7] is, in fact, a well-
established discovery service. It maps domain names to IP
addresses of the actual endpoints. The DNS queries are served
by a local resolver on the DNS server in the same domain. If
the address cannot be resolved locally, the query is resolved by
iteratively contacting the authoritative servers for the domain in
a hierarchical way. The DNS is well governed, but its reliance
on extensive caching results in delays in the propagation of
new entries or updates. To enhance performance, DynDNS
[8] dynamically updates domain names. Papas et al. [9] have
also proposed architecture optimizations to increase DNS
performance. DNS has no built-in privacy mechanisms and
it has format restrictions. ENUM [10] provides a mapping
scheme to the telephone numbering standards (ITU E.164
international numbering plan for public telephone systems),
but not to alternative identifiers, so it cannot deal with cross-
service identity mapping.
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) are decentralized and heav-
ily distributed systems that allow lookup services to query data
using key/value pairs. While DHTs allow to lookup data as
fast as O(log(n)), writing performance strongly depends on
individual nodes [11]. Also, DHT security is a serious concern,
as described in [12], which concludes that a combination of
different methods would be effective but not perfect. Most
DHT deployments depend on Kademlia’s data replication and
redundant routing. Replication, essential for ensuring the re-
quired robustness despite peer churn, makes data modification
expensive, as data has to be synchronized to several nodes.
III. IDENTITY MAPPING AND DISCOVERY PROCESS
IMaDS was designed to provide a mapping between users
and the endpoints where the services they choose to use are
available, while maintaining their privacy. It should decouple
identity from service provider, thus ensuring users are free to
change service providers without being locked in. It should
also have the ability to evolve search beyond what is currently
envisioned, e.g., by combining service and endpoint data with
social data and other sources of information such as user
profiles. IMaDS accomplishes this, while also fulfilling a set
of non-functional requirements: be scalable for worldwide
use, provide low-delay reads, be highly available, prevent
identity theft. IMaDS requirements go beyond the capabilities
of traditional LDAP and DNS, so a fresh approach is needed
to provide greater versatility and flexibility. To facilitate cross-
domain discovery of peers in a fast and reliable fashion,
IMaDS encompasses three major functions that can be used
independently (see Figure 1):
• Domain-Registry Queries: A classic directory ser-
vice within the domain of one service provider. It
provides a list of URLs for currently running hyperties
(communication endpoints) for a given username in a
certain domain. Each service provider makes available
its own Domain Registry.
• Global Registry Queries: A DHT-based global direc-
tory service, mapping user identifiers to the associated
service domains. The Global User ID (GUID) is
resolved to a digitally signed dataset, comprising all
associated service domains and respective identities of
the user account.
• Discovery Service: A dedicated directory combined
with a search engine and a privacy policy database. A
user can create a profile that contains text, description,
hashtags, and geographical information, linked to the
GUID.
Figure 2 shows the interworking of all three parts of
the mapping and discovery process starting from an intuitive
search query in a natural language, to mapping a unique
GUID to a temporarily available URL of a client that can be
connected to.
A. Domain Registry
The Domain Registry’s main function is to provide a
mapping from a userID to the set of endpoints available on
that user’s devices. It is assumed that every service provider
will run its own instance of the Domain Registry that will
store the endpoints for the hyperties provided by that service
provider. When an application is run by the user on one
of its devices, the application will instantiate the hyperties
that provide the services that the application requires. In the
reTHINK framework, the runtime will automatically register
each hyperty instance with the service provider’s Domain
Registry. The Domain Registry uses soft state, the information
about the hyperty instance must be periodically refreshed or it
will be removed.
The Domain Registry provides a REST API that uses the
userID and Service Provider domain as the first hierarchical
level of the URLs. Under each userID, hyperty instances are
stored, one for each service running on each device. For
each hyperty instance, several pieces of information are used,
such as the URL that should be used to reach the endpoint
and its supported capabilities (e.g., voice, video, or chat).
Applications query the Domain Registry in order to determine
how to contact a user. Typical queries include asking for all
of a user’s available endpoints that provide a certain capacity
(e.g., video calling) or asking for the current availability and
reachability status of a previously known endpoint. Endpoints
may became available or unavailable as the device loses
Internet connectivity or the user chooses not to be available.
In reTHINK, applications can request to be notified when a
currently unavailable endpoint comes back online.
Performance and availability are critical aspects of the
Domain Registry, as it is in the critical path for call setup. Due
to network mobility and device churn, the Domain Registry is
write intensive, and consistency is required. On the other hand,
each instance only provides service to a single service provider.
The use of a REST API enables the use of well known load-
balancing and failover techniques. Our deployment architecture
uses replicated load balancers that distribute requests to a set of
application servers. The application servers access a Cassandra
Database, distributed and replicated over several nodes. No
single point of failure exists.
B. Global Registry
The Global Registry is based on the idea of the Global
Social Lookup Service [13] and is designed for collaboration
between different domains, which allows them to discover
destination parties that are not within their own domain.
While each Domain Registry remains an internal facility of a
service provider, the Global Registry is organized as a domain-
independent service that allows other services to query it. To
allow cross-domain lookup of identifiers, the Global Registry
has been designed as a component separated from the Domain
Registry, built on P2P-technology to distribute control over
the system using a Kademlia-based DHT [11]. This way, both
database and workload are distributed over a high number of
servers, which organize communication and management of
the network automatically. The fault tolerant architecture of
the Kademlia architecture minimizes the probability of data
loss due to indirect replication of all data to multiple nodes, as
well as overall system stability due to self-management of the
nodes. As users don’t subscribe to new services that often, the
Global Registry’s load is expected to be heavily read biased.
This is the type of load best served by a DHT, which is scalable
to provide a worldwide service. Also, absolute consistency is
not required. Thus eventual small delays in the propagation
and replication of information are acceptable.
Nodes of the DHT are run by service operators, who cannot
exert control over the managed data or the functionality of
the system altogether. This not only achieves separation of
concerns, but also prevents the system from being vulnerable
due to not exposing a single point of failure. Furthermore,
concerns of allowing a single operator to control the overar-
ching cross-domain lookup altogether are avoided. The Global
Registry service is implemented as a decentralized directory
of users, where users can be enrolled with one or with
multiple service providers at the same time. To associate
users with different services, a service-independent identifier
is necessary. WebRTC architecture introduces the notion of a
service-independent identity that is managed by an Identity
Provider (IdP) and can provide authentication to any service.
Such identities may be authenticated directly in a P2P fashion
[3] for WebRTC calling, but they also need to be associated
with the application based userIDs, to be recognized by their
applications.
Users are identifiable via a self-asserted, domain agnostic
identifier, the GUID, which is linked with the domain-
specific userIDs, according to user instructions. This way,
there is a stable, unifying single identifier that can be
used even when the identity providers themselves are
changed. The GUID is a long alphanumeric identifier that
is generated by a key derivation algorithm for creating
random and unique keys. The result is a typically non-human
readable identifier with a suitable amount of randomness
to guarantee global uniqueness. An example GUID is
OuLbxRKrYcyvfU8cmSqdyxoBq7j3IAypd20iuPDsIg.
Such identifiers may be provided to others by the users, but
the main purpose of such unmemorable identifiers is to link
the user to multiple service identifiers via the application
facilities. The client uses the provided GUID to discover a
list of service providers and contactable userIDs. A user may
have any number of GUIDs and link to them to a different
range of services, if so wished. As the GUID is a self-asserted
identifier, the users’ datasets are managed by the users
themselves using an IMaDS compatible client application for
key management and lookup of communication peers. To
create the GUID, a user creates an ECDSA public key pair
Client
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Fig. 1. Interplay of IMaDS components
[14] and hashes its public key with a cryptographic salt of
fixed length using the key derivation function PBKDF#2 [15]
and SHA256. The binary output of 256 bit length is encoded
using Base64URL [16] and then used as the GUID.
To allow resolving a GUID to service URLs and userIDs,
the GUID, public key, salt, userIDs, as well as additional
information are stored in a JSON-based dataset. This dataset
is then published as a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) [17],
where the digital signature is created using the private key
of the user’s key pair. The dataset is then published in the
Global Registry using the service’s RESTful API for read
and write operations, where the GUID is used as the lookup
key. Thus, any of the collaborative services who share the
Global Registry can resolve a known GUID to the respective
user’s dataset, while the integrity of the dataset’s contents is
guaranteed through the digital signature of the JWT. As GUIDs
are generated in a distributed fashion, attacks are possible that
aim at taking over an IMaDS identity [13]. Since GUIDs
are derived directly from the users public key, an attacker
would need to create a valid signature for a forged dataset.
Simple replacement of the key itself is not possible, as this
would inevitably also change the GUID, resulting in a deflected
attack. Hence, for a successful attack aimed at taking over an
identity, an attacker would need to create a key pair and salt
that creates a collision in PBKDF#2 with SHA256. According
to the birthday bound, for a 1% chance of a collision, 4.8×1037
key pairs and salts would be required, making a successful
attack unreasonably hard to achieve.
C. The Discovery Service
The Discovery Service is able to utilize any information
that can be queried in a search engine. Thus, active endpoints
for a user can be found even without knowing the service
provider, the service-based identity, or even the GUID. The
basic idea of IMaDS discovery is to find users in a natural
and intuitive way, like any natural language search engine.
This way, users can build search queries using facts describing
the search queries’ target, for example, ”Alice,” ”Deutsche
Telekom,” and ”Berlin”:
https://rethink.tlabscloud.com/discovery/rest/
discover/lookup?searchquery=Alice+Deutsche+
Telekom+Berlin
If the search is successful, the discovery service will
provide one or several profiles matching the search query.
{
"instanceID":"telekom1",
"responseCode":201,
"searchString":"Alice",
"results":[{
"resultNo":0,
"hashtags":"#reTHINK #Telekom",
"description":"My profile ,
"GUID":"WabRS8ZRswDNUIYtqF-
j0nHQZmQVRLJimvqIGIYMz50",
"headline":"Testprofile Alice",
"contacts":"www.telekom.de",
"hasGUID":"true",
"hyperties": [{
"url":"hyperty=hyperty%3A%2F%2Frethink.
tlabscloud.com%2F4246e263-eb54-4a",
"userID":"uid=user://gmail.com/alice",
"media":"VIDEO",
"provider":"Deutsche Telekom"
}]
}]
}
A user who wants to be found can create an account at
the IMaDS discovery service, with any number of profiles.
Alice, for example, might have one profile for her business
life and another one for private use. The user can choose what
profile information is stored, e.g., employer, personal address
etc. Hashtags can be added if the user wants to be found under
certain keywords or interests, for example, #football, #tango, or
#paris. Furthermore, a user can specify a number of contacts,
such as email addresses or phone numbers. Additional search
fields, such as a profile photo, may be added to the index
of the search engine. Thus, every profile can be connected
to a particular context by adding keywords, hashtags, or even
geographical information. When a valid GUID is linked to this
profile, it is dynamically mapped via the global and domain
registries to the endpoint activities. Web search engines find
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Fig. 2. IMaDS process of discovering and resolving identifiers
most of its content through ’web-crawling.’ Software agents
crawl the whole web by calling every hyperlink and indexing
every website. As a result, the owner of the website has
no control when his content gets visible and when it will
be deleted. In IMaDS, users are fully in control of their
information. The data is published when a profile is created
and unpublished whenever a profile is deleted. Besides this
’all or nothing’ approach, IMaDS also enables different levels
of data visibility. For every profile, a visibility option can be
chosen. A user profile can be visible for all users, for IMaDS
users only, or just for favorite users. This way, a profile can
be configured to be visible by a small group of known users,
for example, friends, class mates, or colleagues.
The service supports advanced privacy and service features.
Privacy is enabled through changing endpoints: the service
can be configured for a communication client to get a new
URL with every restart or after a configurable time period.
Thus, a malicious party cannot contact this client again, even
if the URL is cached or leaked. When a user wants to contact
the same party, a fresh discovery process is required. The
discovery service enables:
• Privacy through configurable visibility: Users can
configure the visibility of their clients or devices
to other users. IMaDS enables setting fine grained
policies, defining who has access to what information.
The user is in full control of information that is shown
to others.
• Multi-domain, multi-Identifier: The service supports
discovery across different service domains and service
providers. The process works for several identifier
formats, and can handle URLs, phone numbers, postal
addresses, etc.
• Context Sensitivity: IMaDS searching factors can
be linked to any context descriptor, such as user
roles, geo-location data, or keywords. This enables
the IMaDS functions to become basic components for
many other services that require dynamic discovery of
actors (users or things) in volatile environments.
IV. IMADS USAGE SCENARIOS
A typical usage scenario of the IMaDS services comprise a
user Alice, who wants to connect to another user Bob, who is
registered in one or more service domains. If required, Alice
would query the Discovery component to search for Bob using
facts that describe Bob. By resolving Bob’s GUID via the
Global Registry, she receives a list of service domains Bob
is registered with. As each userID in the returned dataset also
comprises information about the respective service provider’s
Domain Registry, Alice can now query the Domain Registry
for Bob’s communication endpoint and establish a connection.
A. Alternative Services
The IMaDS functions were created to find WebRTC peer-
ing parties, but can be used in many other scenarios, as shown
in the following examples:
• Ad Hoc networks: The Domain Registry can handle
clients that popup and disappear within a short time
period.
• Heterogeneous networks like IoT: The process is
protocol-agnostic. Discovery and also Global Registry
could map a GUID to any protocol, not only to HTTP.
• Highly distributed infrastructures: The separation
of Domain and Global Registry as well as the design
of Global Registry as a DHT allows for a high level
of distribution and scalability.
• Highly privacy-aware services: The discovery pro-
cess allows configuring visibilities, ranging from being
visible for closed user groups to being visible for the
whole World Wide Web.
• Community Services: The ability to tag endpoints in
profiles with context, keywords, and geo data enables
a plethora of services. IMaDS is able to find users
with common interests or from the same city or area
that can be provided with certain information.
B. Privacy-Preserving Context-Based Services
The discovery mechanism for activated micro-services
(such as reTHINK hyperties) can be exploited for other types
of activities, under the same infrastructure. Instead of discov-
ering users’ availability to receive calls, the discovery requests
will return current users’ active usage of a particular function,
on a particular device, thus discovering fine-tuned contexts
dynamically. This enables observers to know not only when
a user is online or logged in to a service, but when the user
is actively engaged in a particularly monitored activity. This
also means that the user’s attention is focused on that service,
at that moment, on that device, and at a specific location.
This intelligence enables service providers to deliver highly
targeted support, additional information, advice, or any other
type of time-critical context-based functions. Unlike other such
services, IMaDS users can control this effect by switching it
on or off via the privacy capability for each associated service,
so that the privacy rules are selective.
C. Future Development
Currently, the discovery part containing the IMaDS search
engine is a single instance. In the next version, one discovery
instance can exchange queries and results with others. Thus,
different providers can build their repository of profiles with
their own user interface and own type of information. The re-
THINK project will develop new services that can be modular
add-ons for IMaDS:
• Trust-Engine: This is an engine [2] to evaluate the
level of trust based on past transactions. IMaDS could
take trust-level into account, and mark trusted com-
munication endpoints accordingly.
• Social graph: The social graph [18] stores interactions
and relationships between peers. This could also be
used as an optional parameter for a discovery query.
• Usability: The adoption of IMaDS depends on its
usability for both developers and users. In the next
project phase, reTHINK will focus on a consistent and
secure, yet easy-to-use registration process for service
providers and users.
V. CONCLUSION
IMaDS was developed within the reTHINK project to
find communication endpoint micro-services (hyperties). Fea-
tures like privacy configurations, multi-domain support, and
context sensitivity make this service a good candidate to be
extended to other services. IMaDS introduces two main new
functions: i) Mapping user identities of multiple services to a
user’s chosen independent identifier; the IMaDS mapping of
identities links domain-based service identities and a service-
independent GUID, so that users can control their identity
associations and assign different privacy rules, if so wished;
ii) Discovery of ’live’ micro-services (such as the described
reTHINK hyperties, or other critical monitored processes that
require downloading of micro-service code) when the user
activate them or switches them off. The IMaDS discovery
service is inclusive, not service-related, and responds with
current contact information for the searched user, with several
options of both services and devices that can be reached
via peer-to-peer interaction. This approach is based on peer-
ing mechanisms and user self-management of their identity
structures. The novel method registers activation of micro-
services (hyperties) in local Domain Registries and searches
the Global Registry of collaborating services to reveal currently
available users’ contacts in any domain, without the need for
a central authority. Although this paper describes concepts,
methods, and design for WebRTC communication as developed
in the reTHINK project, the IMaDS functions are proven very
powerful, and can be used in many more service solutions,
such as monitoring critical micro-services usage and IoT
device interactions.
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